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THE FEDERAL COURTS IN THE POLITICAL ORDER: JUDICIAL JURIS-
DICTION AND AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORY. By Martin H. Redish.
Durham: Carolina Academic Press. 1991. Pp. viii, 192. $24.95.
Despite the central position of federal jurisdiction in the American
political scheme, few scholarly books have addressed the subject.
Most federal courts scholarship remains primarily in textbooks,I horn-
books,2 and law review articles.3 Professor Martin Redish4 has taken
a step toward filling this void with the publication of The Federal
Courts in the Political Order.
Redish believes scholars have shrunk from applying political the-
ory to issues of federal jurisdiction, yet he is not the first scholar to
marry political theory and jurisdictional doctrine. All scholarly dis-
course on federal jurisdiction has been, in some sense, premised on
political theory. Nevertheless, The Federal Courts in the Political Or-
der makes a valuable contribution to the federal courts literature by
identifying and criticizing the political premises behind the various
commentaries regarding federal jurisdiction and providing its own
normative political theory to buttress jurisdictional doctrines.
Professor Redish criticizes and builds jurisdictional doctrines from
two fundamental precepts of American political theory: the represen-
tational and countermajoritarian principles. These two principles are
at once complementary and antipodal; they are two sides of the same
coin.
The representational principle provides simply that judges may not
ignore constitutionally valid legislative policy choices (p. 4). The
countermajoritarian principle, in contrast, provides that courts may
not avoid their duty to adjudicate constitutional challenges to legisla-
tive, executive, or agency action (p. 4). To Redish, any political sys-
tem providing for judicial review logically and ineluctably recognizes
each of these theoretical underpinnings. Consequently, because juris-
dictional doctrines such as judge-made abstention and most political
question doctrine (which itself might be viewed as a horizontal or in-
terbranch form of abstention) allow courts to avoid their constitution-
ally mandated functions, they impermissibly flout the representational
and countermajoritarian principles. Judges' time would be better
1. See, eg., PAUL M. BATOR ET AL., HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM (3d ed. 1988).
2. See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION (1989).
3. See, e.g., Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court, 1960 Term - Foreword: The Passive
Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REv. 40 (1961); Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitu-
tional Law, 73 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1959).
4. Louis and Harriet Ancel Professor of Law, Northwestern University.
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spent grappling with the merits of the cases before them than fashion-
ing abstruse excuses to avoid such substantive inquiry.
Redish fortifies his two fundamental principles, therefore, by de-
bunking the validity of the abstention and political question doctrines.
Indeed, The Federal Courts in the Political Order largely derives from
law review articles Redish had previously published on each subject; 5
it does not cover all, or even most of the issues one might encounter in
a traditional federal courts curriculum. It does not discuss, for exam-
ple, federal habeas corpus, or even federal question jurisdiction.
Rather, it focuses squarely on the judge-made doctrines that regulate
the exercise of judicial review.
Redish opens the book by using the representational principle to
attack some of the modem, "progressive" views on the appropriate
role of the judiciary (Chapter Two). Specifically, the representational
principle leaves no room for hermeneutics that allow judges to make
any policy choices outside of those made in validly enacted legislation.
Take, for example, "neo-republican" theory. Neo-republican theory
takes root from public choice theory, which postulates that legislation
represents compromises among elite special interests in derogation of
the public good6 and adds that judges should free themselves from the
shackles of legislative intent and seek to identify superior values upon
which to make decisions. 7 From the perspective of the representa-
tional principle, Redish views neo-republican theory as "the epitome
of anti-democratic thought" (p. 13). Any dichotomy between public
values and private interests is inherently false in a democratic system
(p. 14).
Redish criticizes other modes of statutory construction along simi-
lar lines. The "textual deconstructionist" (pp. 20-22), "political
deconstructionist" (p. 22), and "functionalist" (pp. 22-24), as well as
the "neo-republican" (pp. 24-25) models of statutory interpretation all
posit that legislative intent, if it in fact may be discerned, should not
bind the decisionmaker. Consequently, each model suffers from the
same antidemocratic plague and misguided assumptions about the ju-
diciary's ability to identify objectively anything other than legislative
intent. Curiously, Professor Redish does not believe that the judiciary
5. Martin H. Redish, Abstention, Separation of Powers, and the Limits of the Judicial Func-
tion, 94 YALE L.. 71 (1984); Martin H. Redish, Judicial Review and the "Political Question," 79
Nw. U. L. REv. 1031 (1984-85).
6. See Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65 TEXAS
L. REv. 873 (1987); Symposium on the Theory of Public Choice, 74 VA. L. REv. 167 (1988).
7. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., What is Republicanism, and Is It Worth Reviving?, 102 HARV.
L. REv. 1695 (1989); Suzanna Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional
Adjudication, 72 VA. L. REv. 543 (1986); Cass Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97
YALE L.J. 1539, 1582 (1988); Cass Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN.
L. REV. 29, 31-32 (1985); Symposium, The Republican Civic Tradition, 97 YALE L.J. 1493
(1988).
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should always remain value-neutral; occasionally, he notes, it must ex-
ercise its "gap-filling" function:
[While t]he most important insight [of the representational principle] is
that nonconstitutionally controlled issues - including those involving
judicial jurisdiction - are to be resolved on the basis of judicial policy
assessment only to the extent that the representative branches have not
already made that policy choice through legislative action.., situations
will arise in which a good-faith judicial effort to determine whether -
and how - a statute resolves a specific question will... be effectively
fruitless. In such an event, judicial resolution on the basis of the court's
own assessment of the competing social and political policies will proba-
bly be unavoidable . . . . But, . . . judicial resort to such a practice
[should] come only as a last resort .... [p. 19]
Considering the vigor with which Redish derides judges for mak-
ing policy choices, one might wonder why Redish allows for any "ex-
ceptions" to the formalistic rigor of the representational principle.
Worse, because much, if not all, judicial decisionmaking involves some
form of gap-filling, the exception comes dangerously close to swallow-
ing the rule. In short, the gap-filling exception stands as a bald anom-
aly - Redish simply fails to reconcile this exception logically with the
representational principle, and therefore to explain his dogmatic
retreat.
Before using the representational principle as a foil against judge-
made abstention, Redish discusses the implications of the principle for
federal common law. Not surprisingly, the representational principle
requires that judges cannot make federal common law. Legislatures
may vest broad discretion in courts to fashion "common law," as in
labor law,8 but courts that make such rules are really engaging in stat-
utory interpretation (p. 33).
To argue that the making of common law and "gap-filling" accord-
ing to independent, judicial policy choices are forms of statutory inter-
pretation borders on the preposterous. Evidently Redish has assumed,
through the representational principle, that all lawmaking must de-
volve from legislatures. As a result, he must transmute what the ordi-
nary observer would call judicial lawmaking - such as the making of
a common law of labor agreements - into statutory interpretation.
The history of our political system reveals, however, that lawmaking
has never been confined solely to legislatures; at the very least, courts
have always been assumed to have some power to make law.9 The real
question is niot who can make law, but what confines each governmen-
tal branch's lawmaking power.
8. See § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1988)),
interpreted in Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957) (§ 301 allows judges
to develop a common law governing collective bargaining agreements).




Redish does not discuss the limits on the extent to which legisla-
tures may convey lawmaking power to the courts. The representa-
tional principle and separation of powers concerns may have even
greater force than Redish has acknowledged. Would legislatures vio-
late the representational principle by abdicating their obligation to
make policy; for example, by passing a law vesting all lawmaking au-
thority in federal courts as far as the Constitution would allow Con-
gress to legislate? Redish should have expended greater effort to
define the contours of proper legislative constraint.10
Moreover, Redish construes the Rules Decision Act'1 - providing
that state law applies in federal courts except when preempted by fed-
eral or constitutional law - as an independent congressional judg-
ment that courts should not create federal common law. That position
is a far cry from the posture of those arguing that courts have no in-
dependent authority to make federal common law, and it echoes the
logic of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins. 1 2 Whatever the weaknesses of
Redish's interpretation of the Rules Decision Act, they do not detract
from his cogent criticism of Professors Westen and Lehman's con-
struction of the Rules Decision Act to justify judicial power to make
federal common law.13 Redish convincingly demonstrates that Wes-
ten and Lehman premise their argument that federal common law is
itself a "rule of decision" on the belief that statutory interpretation
and common lawmaking are not inherently different (p. 32). Given
that a difference exists (and Redish argues persuasively that it does,
though this is a controversial argument whose persuasiveness may de-
pend largely on its aesthetic appeal), courts should be able to recognize
it and thus limit themselves to the tasks of statutory interpretation and
gap-filling.14
In some sense, the chapter on federal common law is an interlude;
it is judge-made abstention that feels the full brunt of Redish's on-
slaught with the representational principle rapier. Judge-made absten-
tion - the jurisdictional doctrine by which federal courts, despite
having valid jurisdiction, refrain from deciding a case on the merits to
further federalism and judicial efficiency15 - is judicial usurpation of
legislative power (p. 49). Because abstention frustrates the enforce-
10. See p. 33 for Redish's minimal offering in this regard.
11. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1988).
12. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). For a discussion of this point, see John H. Ely, The Irrepressible
Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REv. 693, 704 (1974).
13. See Peter Westen & Jeffrey S. Lehman, Is There Life for Erie After the Death of Diver-
sity?, 78 MICH. L. REv. 311 (1980).
14. Pp. 33-42. One might query whether federal common law is really a form of gap-filling;
if so, then Redish would have to concede that the Rules Decision Act allows federal common
lawmaking just as Westen and Lehman argue. In that case, Redish's earlier failure to account for
gap-filling in terms of the representational principle would take on even greater significance.
15. See Railroad Commn. of Tex. v. Pullman, 312 U.S. 496 (1941); Younger v. Harris, 401
U.S. 37 (1971).
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ment of validly legislated policy choices and amounts to the exercise of
an independent policy choice without requisite statutory authority,
any such decision not to exercise jurisdiction violates the separation of
powers principle (p. 50). Abstention, even when it merely delays a
federal court's decision on the merits, amounts to statutory repeal (p.
50).
Redish does not believe that notions of discretion are inherent in
the concept of jurisdiction. Professor David Shapiro, one of the most
noteworthy critics of Redish's position in this regard, has pointed out
that the judiciary has always exercised some quantum of bounded dis-
cretion, as exemplified by doctrines such as forum non conveniens, pen-
dent and ancillary jurisdiction, and ripeness, and by general common
law history. 16 Redish responds to this criticism (correspondingly up-
dating and clarifying the position taken in his law review article) with
two types of arguments. First, he distinguishes from abstention each
of the putatively analogous examples of discretion-based doctrine by
highlighting various functional differences between abstention and
those other doctrines (pp. 64-67). For example, forum non conveniens
is "geographically, rather than systemically, based." 17 Arguments of
this kind are facile - Shapiro's argument is easily neutralized by at-
omization and piecemeal criticism of each analogy - but they miss
the point. Why should the judiciary ever, under any doctrine, exercise
discretion without statutory authorization?
Aware of that criticism, Redish suggests that Shapiro's "empiri-
cal" argument is irrelevant to Redish's own "normative" critique (p.
63); hence, Redish's normative argument applies to the abstention
"analogues" as well. Indeed, he suggests that pendent and ancillary
jurisdiction also may be subject to separation-of-powers attack (p. 66).
Yet Redish's rebuttal to Shapiro ignores Shapiro's normative theme:
that courts might be institutionally better adapted to the jurisdictional
fine-tuning involved in abstention, thus justifying abstention as judge-
made doctrine on institutional grounds.18
The second half of the book establishes the countermajoritarian
principle as the lens through which to focus case-and-controversy
(standing), mootness, ripeness, and political question doctrines. The
countermajoritarian principle proceeds from Professor Redish's belief
that "judicial review is [not] a physical necessity of a constitutional
system, [but] a logical or practical necessity" (p. 79). Consequently,
courts have an unflagging obligation to enforce the provisions of the
Constitution. The judiciary is the only institution designed for such a
function.
16. David L. Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REv. 543 (1985).
17. P. 65. He further notes that Congress eventually codified the doctrine of forum non
conveniens at 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1988). Id.
18. See Shapiro, supra note 16, at 574.
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The countermajoritarian principle thus contrasts with Professor
Alexander Bickel's "passive virtues" 19 rationales of discretionary judi-
cial restraint. Furthermore, Redish has no qualms with the an-
tidemocratic nature of judicial review. He sees judicial review as a
logical necessity of a constitutional system. Courts should not there-
fore create complex and technical doctrines merely in order to mini-
mize the political impact of the judiciary (p. 87).
Once one accepts, as Redish does, such a grand, indeed active, role
for the judiciary, the various justiciability doctrines - as fashioned by
the courts and rationalized by various commentators - are easy prey.
For example, Redish assails the "injury-in-fact" 20 requirement for a
Constitutional "case-or-controversy" 21 as
fundamentally inconsistent with recognition of the judiciary's important
political role in providing a constitutional check on the majorit[]arian
branches, as dictated by the Counter-Majoritarian principle. By super-
imposing a "private rights" model of adjudication on constitutional liti-
gation, use of the injury-in-fact requirement effectively undermines
judicial performance of that role. [p. 89]
In turn, the "private rights" model, which posits that courts should
only decide disputes between individuals, 22 straightjackets courts from
properly adjudicating many cases of "macro-impact on the national
political process" (pp. 93-94). Moreover, injury-in-fact is not an in-
trinsic feature of judicial restraint. Instead, "the appropriate battle-
ground for judicial restraint is in the fashioning of the substantive
decision" (p. 95).
Redish paints "political question" doctrine23 as the most perni-
cious of the "passive virtues." The book's penultimate chapter is de-
voted entirely to this subject. In short, Redish reasons, first, that
political question doctrine exists, contrary to Professor Louis Henkin's
assertions, 24 and second, that one cannot argue in any principled way
that the judiciary is responsible for interpreting some constitutional
clauses but not others (p. 117). Only if the judiciary has the last word
on the whole literary corpus of the Constitution can it felicitously
check the majoritarian branches (pp. 124-25, 134-36). Like the repre-
19. See generally ALExANDER M. BicKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 111-98
(1962); Bickel, supra note 3.
20. See, eg., Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38 (1976).
21. See U.S. CoNsr. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
22. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803).
23. Political question doctrine holds that certain questions and their resolutions fall within
the particular purview of legislative or executive power and consequently are not suited to judi-
cial review. See, eg., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). In other words, the actions of certain
political branches must be accorded some finality. See Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 454-55
(1939).
24. Pp. 112-16 (discussing Louis Henkin, Is There a "Political Question" Doctrine?, 85 YALE
L.J. 597 (1976)).
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sentational principle, the countermajoritarian principle functions cate-
gorically; it has no bounds.
In The Federal Courts in the Political Order, and indeed in his ca-
reer, Professor Redish certainly has carved a niche for himself. As
this book demonstrates, one can construct a political theory that de-
rides the "passive virtues" while avoiding the subjectivity, indetermi-
nacy, and potential for juridical abuse inherent in the more
"progressive" political theories suggested to operate the constitutional
system. In taking this stance, however, Redish ultimately counsels to-
ward allowing the judiciary very little flexibility in jurisdictional mat-
ters. To some federal courts scholars, Redish's antipragmatic theories
will smack of fetishistic formalism; to others they will savor of the
comfortable securities of consistency and clarity. And, although lacu-
nae blotch those theories, they are undoubtedly important and
provocative.
- James Hopenfeld
